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INTRODUCTION
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the
Centre) is an international institution set up under the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States' (the Convention), whose immediate purpose is laid down
in its title: the creation of machinery for the settlement of disputes
involving a governmental party on one side and a foreign private inves-
tor on the other. The further aim of the Convention is related to that
of the World Bank Group: 2 to promote the flow of funds from capital-
exporting countries to developing countries.
The present study is not intended to give a detailed account of the
functioning of the Centre. Its organization, the scope of its jurisdiction,
and the flexibility and enforceability of its provisions have been de-
scribed and commented upon in numerous excellent publications.3 The
aim of this article is to shed some light on the appropriateness of some
procedural aspects of arbitration under the auspices of the Centre
against the background of traditional means for settling international
investment disputes.
The importance and usefulness of the institutional arbitration
procedures of the Centre must be seen against an existing gap in interna-
tional law: there was no forum which functioned effectively and which
offered suitable means of settling investment disputes directly between
• *Attorney, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Dr. Recht (1970) and
M.C.L. (1971) University of Ghent. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the
IRBD or ICSID.
'Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, August 25, 1965, [19661 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into
force October 14, 1966.) The text of the Convention and the accompanying Report of the Executive
Directors (hereinafter ED Report) is reprinted in 60 A.J.I.L. 892 (1966) and 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
524 (1965). In the United States the provisons of the Convention are in part implemented by the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 344 (1966), 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1650 and 1650a (1970).
"The other members of the World Bank Group are the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, International Development Association, and the International Finance Corpo-
ration. The Centre is the only non-financial member of the World Bank Organizations.
3A legal bibliography relating to the Centre is published in the annex to its Annual Reports.
For a recent comprehensive study, see Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy
of Int'l Law) 331 (1972).
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a private party and a governmental party. Both conciliation and arbitra-
tion proceedings can be conducted under the Convention. This study will
focus more particularly on arbitration.
Judicial practice in the settlement of investment disputes has been
severely criticized for a lack of flexibility and realism in applying the
rules of customary international law; the traditional arbitration pattern,
which is essentially a conventional way of settling disputes, has been
criticized for its lack of binding effect. The aim of the Convention is to
fill those lacunae, and the effectiveness of the Convention is to be
weighed against the background of the traditional process for the en-
forcement of international law (with particular reference to the decision
of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case) and of traditional arbitration.
An analysis of some procedural aspects of the Convention will show how
maximum freedom is offered to the parties to arbitration proceedings
under it with the corollary that no party can fail to cooperate once the
proceedings have been instituted.
THE LACK OF SECURITY FOR INVESTORS UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW
The recent decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Barcelona Traction case4 has been extensively commented upon' and
severely criticized.' Without going deeply into the reasons which led the
court to take such a strict position, the following conclusion can be
drawn: "If unlawful injuries to a corporation which sap the economic
content of the shares do not justify the exercise of diplomatic protection
on behalf of the shareholders, then one has to conclude that property
in the new form of shareholdings is not protected in international law." 7
Indeed, Belgium's locus standi, espousing the claim of its nationals who
were holding a substantial part of the shares in an investment, was
denied. If this case is to be considered as a test case for the present status
of customary international law, then one has to conclude that interna-
tional law presents a serious lacuna. The ICJ said in fact that the norm
of customary international law was silent in this respect.' The court
'Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. [1970] I.C.J. 3.
'See Note, I GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 179 (1970).
'Lillich, Two Perspectives on the Barcelona Traction Case: The Rigidity of Barcelona, 65
A.J.I.L. 522 (1971); Mann, The Protection of Shareholders' Interests in the Light of the Barcelona
Traction Case, 67 A.J.I.L. 259 (1973).
7Abi-Saab, The U.S. in World Affairs, in ANNALS OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 16 (1971).
'See 1971 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 341, and the conclusion drawn by Professor Suy:
I think that the decision of the Court is a very wise lesson, and the Court at the end of
the Judgment encourages states to look for bilateral and multilateral solutions. If there
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concluded: "Where it is a question of an unlawful act committed against
a company representing foreign capital, the general rule of international
law authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a
claim."' Where, as in the case at hand, the shareholders have a substan-
tial interest in the investment, the lack of security is afortiori feared
by those corporations involved in a variety of interlocking sharehold-
ings. The court defined'" and applied strictly the rules of international
law as they now stand as to diplomatic protection. Whether customary
international law has not reached the stage of development which re-
sponds to the needs of modern business transactions, or whether interna-
tional law merely shows a lack of flexibility, the result remains un-
changed: some substantial interests go wholly unprotected under inter-
national law.
Since the existence of a legal interest does not per se justify protection
under international law, it is up to the parties to an investment agree-
ment to define the limits of such protection. Under the system set out
in the Convention, adequate protection can be afforded to the parties
to investment transactions. The national State of the investor, party to
a dispute submitted to the Centre, waives its right of diplomatic protec-
tion" and the strict rules pertaining to that right no longer apply. The
parties, having consented to the jurisdiction of the Centre, will be able
to bring their claim directly before an international forum insofar as the
requirements as to the jurisdiction of the Centre have been met. While
the dispute will be removed from the State-to-State level, the procedural
rights and obligations of the parties will be determined by the provisions
of the Convention, which are enforceable under international law.
ARBITRATION UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW: LACUNAE AND NEED FOR A
CONVENTION
Arbitration is a conventional way of settling disputes. Taking into
is a conclusion to be drawn from the decision, it must be to push forward the efforts of
the World Bank and the efforts of the states to solve their investment disputes through
the procedures provided for by the World Bank and not to bother any longer the
International Court with this type of dispute.
Id. at 354.
'[1970] I.C.J. 3, 47.
"'Id. at 46:
[lIn inter-state relations, whether claims are made on behalf of a State's national or on
behalf of the State itself, they are always the claims of the State.
The Court then quoted the statement of the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions Case:
The question, therefore, whether the . ..dispute originates in an injury to a private
interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant
from this standpoint. [19241 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 2.
"CONVENTION art. 27, para. 3.
1974]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
consideration the arbitration practice between States and individuals,'"
the situation can be summarized as follows: recourse to arbitration
proceedings is the result of an agreement to arbitrate, contained in a
general or a particular instrument, whereby the parties agree that dis-
putes between them (or arising out of the application or the interpreta-
tion of the instrument in which the agreement is embodied) should be
referred to an arbitral tribunal. Even if the law governing international
contracts between a State and a private party is sometimes difficult to
define, these contracts are regarded as being valid, both parties having
the capacity to enter into such agreements. The major question arises
with respect to the effects of such an international contract, i.e., per-
formance or nonperformance by either party.'" The real effectiveness
of a contract and the obligations contained in it, such as compulsory
recourse to arbitration, depend on its binding character for the State
party vis-a-vis an investor and vice versa. The parties are, by principle,
bound by their undertakings. The question which arises is: how can the
performance of that obligation be secured, i.e., what sanctions can be
applied, and under which system of law, against unilateral disregard of
arbitral commitments? The legal nature of contracts between States (or
State agencies) and private entities has been subject to much contro-
versy, and it can still not be said that the nonperformance by a State of
its obligations under a contract with an alien individual does give rise
to international responsibility. A remedy had to be found for the fragil-
ity of the classical arbitration agreement between a State and an individ-
ual. In addition, under international law, individuals lack procedural
capacity, except where rights have been granted to them specifically by
a treaty or an international agreement.
The binding character of the consent to arbitration is the crucial point
both in securing the good conduct of arbitration proceedings, and in the
performance of the resulting obligations. As to the proper conduct of
the arbitration proceeding, it is customary in arbitration agreements to
specify that each party appoint an arbitrator and that they in turn
appoint an umpire. Failing agreement of the parties to nominate an
umpire and in order to prevent frustration in the early stage of the
12See Gromley, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND
SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS (The Hague, 1966); Ketcham, Arbitration Between a State and a
Foreign Private Party, in SYMPOSIUM: PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD, RIGHTS AND DUTIES 403
(1965): Donke, Arbitration Between Governmental Bodies and Foreign Private Firms, 17 ARB.
J. 129 (1962): Spofford, International Status and Access to International Tribunals, 113 RECUEIL
DES COURS (Hague Academy of Int'l Law) 171 (1964).
':'See Schwebel, Speculations on Specific Performance of a Contract Between a State and a
Foreign National, in SYMPOSIUM: PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD, RIGHTS AND DUTIES, 201 (1965).
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constitution of an arbitration tribunal, it can be provided that the um-
pire be appointed by a designated impartial authority, such as the Presi-
dent of the ICJ. Provision can also be made for the appointment of a
sole arbitrator. Thus, specific provisions can theoretically prevent frus-
tration in case of nonperformance by the adverse party. As a whole, an
arbitration agreement lays down the foundation of a procedure to be
conducted by the parties and implies an obligation for the parties to
comply with the resulting decision. The lex fori can define the lex
arbitri" or the arbitration procedure can be governed by international
law.' 5
As O'Connell says:
Where a governmental contract contains an arbitration clause and the
Contracting State refuses to arbitrate, the latter is guilty of a denial
of justice just as much as if it obstructed the contractor in his resort
to the municipal law remedies contemplated in the contractual rela-
tionship. Hence, the private contractor may instantly invoke the pro-
tection of his State or, if the contract lays down sufficient guidance as
to the machinery of arbitration and the appointment of an arbitrator,
he may proceed to arbitration in the absence of the State and obtain
an award.'
International practice has shown" that such situations leave some un-
certainty as to the compulsory character of such a procedure and its
resulting obligations. Where a private party acting against a State
through arbitration cannot rely on direct international law remedies to
prevent frustration of its intentions under the arbitration agreement,
interstate remedies become available only after his national State es-
pouses his claim.
Refusal to arbitrate can take place in the earliest stage of the proceed-
ings, e.g., in a lack of cooperation in the constitution of the Tribunal.
While unilateral measures can be taken by the plaintiff as far as pro-
vided in the agreement, they still can be contested by the defendant.
Thus, one of the parties could paralyze the effect of the arbitration
procedure both in its different stages of progression and once a decision
"Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 INT'L L. REP. 136, 168-70 (1967);
Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrurn, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 155, 161 (1967).
'"See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 INTL L. REP. 117, 155-56 (1963);
for comments see Kojanec, Problemes de I'Arbitrage Entre Etats et Compagnies Privi'es Etra-
gores. 37/38 Y.B. of the A.A.A. (Ass'n of Attenders & Alumni, Hague Academy of Int'l Law)
99, 104 (1967/68). '62 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 990 (1970).
'
7For example, cases where the governmental party did not appear in the proceedings, as in the
case of Soci6t6 Europ6enne d'Etudes et d'Enterprises v. Yugoslavia, 24 INT'L L. REP. 761 (1957);
cf. the Sapphire case, note 14 supra.
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is reached. Even if the rights of one of the parties are defined in such a
way that the proceedings themselves cannot be prevented by hindrance
of the other party, once an award has been rendered such an arbitral
tribunal may have no power to have it enforced.
Tt-E CONVENTION SECURES THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS
OF EITHER PARTY TO ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
No Contracting State shall by the mere fact of being a member of
the Centre be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to
the Centre," but once given, a consent cannot be unilaterally withdrawn
by either party, even if one of the Contracting States concerned should
withdraw from the Centre. 9
A very important feature of the Convention, as compared with arbi-
tration under customary law, is the internationalization of the arbitra-
tion agreement itself, of the procedure in its entirety, and of the obliga-
tions of both the private and the governmental parties under this proce-
dure. In addition, the provisions contained in the Convention prevent
frustration of an arbitration agreement as a result of gaps in the agree-
ment between parties or through the action or inaction of one of the
parties. Similarly, while the parties are relatively free to agree on any
procedural rules for the conduct of their proceeding, rules have been
promulgated which apply automatically to the extent that the parties
fail to agree on any procedural points. Thus, such disagreements will
not prevent the initiation or progress of a proceeding.
The Convention not only allows a private claimant to bring a claim
himself without espousal by his national State, but his national State
expressly abandons its power of diplomatic protection.20 This principle
could be considered as being inconsistent with traditional international
law where a wrong done to a national of one State for which another
State was internationally responsible is actionable, not by the injured
national, but by his State. In a number of instances, provision had been
made for direct arbitration between a host State and a foreign investor,
but those arrangements did not have an internationally binding charac-
ter. The Convention filled that gap, and by doing so recognized the
individual as a subject of international law.
The jurisdiction of the Centre ratione materiae extends to "legal
disputes," and the dispute must be one "arising directly out of an invest-
ment". 2 In addition, the conditio sine qua non for submission of a
'Preamble, to the CONVENTION.
"SID CONVENTION art. 25, para. 1; art. 72.
'Id.. art. 27, para. I.
2
'-Id., art. 25, para. I, and ED Report 26,27 supra note I. See SZASZ, A Practical Guide to the
[Vol. 4:2
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dispute to the Centre is the existence of valid consent by the parties.2
Agreements consenting to the jurisdiction of the Centre obtain
irrevocable force from the Convention itself.2 3 Once they have given
their consent, the parties are taken up in the network of internationally
binding rules set out in the Convention. As soon as proceedings are
initiated, the machinery, i.e., the self-contained system of the Conven-
tion, is set in motion with obligations to be performed under treaty law.
The role of an international convention in securing the performance
of arbitration proceedings by institutionalizing them consists of rein-
forcing the mere agreement to arbitrate to the extent that the uncer-
tainty affecting the traditional arbitration pattern is diminished. The
Convention secures recognition of the principle that a private party may
have direct access to a State before an international tribunal. As a
corollary, not only the Contracting States are bound by the provisions
of the Convention, but also the private party. The Convention grants
rights and imposes duties on both consenting parties.
Like the traditional arbitration clause, the consent to arbitration
under the Convention can be incorporated in a general or a particular
instrument.24 But the legal character of the contract, the law applicable
to it, etc., are no longer crucial to the determination of the procedural
rights and duties of the parties under arbitration. Without isolating the
consent clause from the contract in which it appears, the consent be-
longs to a different legal sphere. The consent, without necessarily being
an international instrument, creates international obligations. When a
party consents to bring a dispute before the Centre, the performance of
that agreement is ensured by an international convention.
What are the consequences of a valid consent to arbitrate under the
Convention? Consent involves submission to compulsory arbitration
with, as a corollary of the direct access of the individual to this interna-
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, I CORNELL J. INT'L L. 1, 13-15 (1968).
22CONVENTION art. 25, para. I and ED Report 23, 24. Except that consent must be given in
writing, there are no other special requirements as to form. The consent can be recorded in two
separate instruments.
2-ld. See also supra note 19 and infra note 24.
"See supra note 22. Advance consents to the jurisdiction of the Centre have been recorded in
numerous investment agreements (e.g., 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1085 (1967)), in bilateral treaties
for the protection and promotion of foreign investments and in domestic legislation such as invest-
ment laws and codes. Consent can be given in connection with a new investment agreement, with
an existing agreement whose disputes provisions are considered unsatisfactory by the parties, or
with respect to any legal dispute that has already arisen. The Centre has prepared a set of "Model
Clauses" for this purpose. and the Secretariat of the Centre is at the disposal of interested parties
in connection with the drafting of conciliation and/or arbitration clauses and other matters arising
under the Convention.
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tional forum, a waiver of diplomatic protection on the part of the na-
tional State of the-private investor. The Convention creates a complete
jurisdictional system, which leaves the parties great latitude, but at the
same time ensures that the absence of an agreement between the parties
as to specific aspects of the procedure will not prevent the arbitration
machinery to function properly. Consent to- such arbitration involves,
unless otherwise stated, the exclusion of any other remedy 5 and the
applicability of the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of internation-
al law as may be applicable." The consent of the parties can require ex-
haustion of local administrative and judicial remedies and determine
specifically which are the rules of law to be applied. Thus, the Conven-
tion grants a direct internationally binding character to obligations
which could not have been secured in a classical arbitration clause.
Furthermore, important gaps, as they appeared in the conduct of tradi-
tional arbitration procedures, are covered by the general and the specific
provisions of the Convention, which complement each other in offering
solutions for most foreseeable situations.
Once one or both of the parties to an investment dispute has ad-
dressed a request for arbitration to the Secretary-General of the Centre
following the modalities prescribed by the Rules of Procedure for the
Institution of Proceedings27 and if the matter is not manifestly
outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, that request will be registered,"
25CoNVENTION art. 26; see Schwebel and Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local
Remedies, 60 A.J.I.L. 484 (1966).
2 CONVENTION art. 41, para. 2; see Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States: Applicable Law and Default Procedure,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12, 13-19 (1967); Lauterpacht, The World Bank Convention on the
Settlement of International Investment Disputes, RECUEIL D'ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
EN HoINIAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM, 652-62 (1968).27Doc. ICSID/4, Part B., [hereinafter Institution Rules]; reprinted at 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
363-65 (1968).
" CONVENTION, Art. 36. On January 13, 1972 the Secretary-General registered the first request
for arbitration pursuant to Article 36 of the Convention. The request concerned a dispute arising
out of an agreement between the Government of Morocco and two private companies, Holiday
Inns S.A. (A Swiss company) and Occidental Petroleum Inc. (a U.S. corporation). The arbitral
tribunal was constituted on March 28, 1972, having as President Judge Sture Petren (Swedish) and
as other members Sir John Foster (British) and Professor Paul Reuter (French). On December
29, 1972. the counter-memorial of the Defendant Party raised an objection to jurisdiction pursuant
to Arbitration Rule 41(1). On July 1, 1973 the Tribunal decided inter alia: that it was competent
with respect to the dispute submitted to it; and that Holiday Inns S. A., Occidental Petroleum
Corporation and Holiday Inns, Inc. were entitled to be parties to the proceedings. At the time of
publication, the proceedings in this case, were still pending Annex 6, International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Seventh Annual Report 1972/1973. On March 6, 1974, the
second such request was registered. It concerned a dispute between Soci6t Adriano Gardella
S.P.A. (anltolian Company) and the Government of Ivory Coast.
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and the proceedings will be deemed to have been instituted.29 The Con-
vention leaves great latitude to the parties as to the constitution of the
tribunal. Nevertheless, if one party refuses to cooperate, the Chairman
of the Administrative Council of the Centre can, at the request of either
party, take the necessary action so that a tribunal be constituted. 3 In
addition it should be noted that the challenges which appeared in tradi-
tional arbitration practice have been eliminated under the Convention.
As soon as the tribunal has been constituted, proceedings can begin.3 1
For the working procedure of the tribunal, as for the constitution of the
tribunal, the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings 32 (except
those that merely reproduce binding provisions of the Convention) apply
only to the extent that the parties do not otherwise agree.3 3 Whenever
the parties do not agree on some procedural point that is not, or is only
inadequately covered by these Rules, then the tribunal has a residual
power to decide the questionY.3 This is, in fact, only declaratory of the
inherent power of the arbitral tribunal to formulate its own rules of
procedure in the event of a lacuna.
CAPACITY OF PARTIES TO SUBMIT DISPUTES TO THE CENTRE
The jurisdiction of the Centre ratione personae is very narrowly de-
fined. However, parties desiring to submit existing or future disputes to
the Centre in many cases are in a position to remedy a jurisdictional
disability at the time of their consent. Compared with traditional means
of settling investment disputes, the Convention offers maximum free-
dom in this respect.
One of the parties to a dispute submitted to the Centre must be "a
Contracting State . . . or a constituent subdivision or agency of a Con-
tracting State designated to the Centre by that State."3 In addition to
the requirement that the subdivision or agency must have been desig-
nated to the Centre by that State, to consent validly to the jurisdiction
of the Centre this consent must either be approved by the Contracting
State concerned or that State must have informed the Centre that it has
waived the requirement of such approval.3 1
2 Institution Rule 6(l).
: CONVENTION art. 38 in addition, Chapter V of the Convention contains rules in connection
with the replacement and disqualification of arbitrators.
:"Arbitration Rule 6(I) (See note 32 infra).
:"Doc. ICSID/4, Part D. [Hereinafter Arbitration Rules].
:"CONVENTION art. 44.
"id.
111d., art. 25, para. 1.
111d., art. 25, para. 3.
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The Convention lays down no requirements as to what constitutes a
"constituent subdivision or agency." This matter is left to the discretion
of the Contracting State. This is a necessary expansion since many
foreign investment transactions are conducted, not through the State
itself, but through political subdivisions, public agencies or other offices
created especially for that purpose, mostly with some financial auton-
omy.
The other party to the dispute must be a national of a Contracting
State other than that of the governmental party and it may be either a
natural or a juridical person. 7
The nationality of investors in the context of settlement of interna-
tional investment disputes has become a recurrent theme of debate for
many years," and the problem has not been solved by the International
Court's decision in the Barcelona Traction case. The increasing import-
ance of multinational corporaions is likely to render the problem even
more acute. The nationality of the investor is also significant within the
framework of the Convention in connection with the issue of the protec-
tion of shareholders.
The Convention requires the private party to have the nationality of
a Contracting State other than the governmental party, but it does not
further specify what is meant by such nationality. In the drafting stage 9
of the Convention, a special procedure for dealing with preliminary
questions as to nationality was prescribed; these questions were not
submitted to the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, but
were left to be decided in the last instance by the ICJP ° The comment
on this draft said that "The objection to the jurisdiction dealt with in
this section is based not on a dispute as to the agreement of the parties,
i.e., the consent of the parties which is an indispensable prerequisite for
the jurisdiction of the Centre, but as to the applicability of the Conven-
tion to the dispute, which is another indispensable element. While the
first interests only the parties, the second interests the Contracting
States. For that reason [the draft] prescribes a different method for
deciding whether the objection is well founded." A further draft pro-
vided that any claim of a party to a dispute that the Commission or the
:71Id., art. 25, paras. 1,2.
:"See van Hecke, Nationality of Companies Abroad, 8 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 223 (1961).
"All relevant preparatory documents have been collected and reproduced in a legislative history
on the Convention known as DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF
THlE CONVENTION (1970), [hereinafter HISTORY].
'Working paper in the form of a draft Convention, prepared by the General Counsel of the
IBRD, 2 HISTORY 5.
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Tribunal lacks competence on the ground that a party to the dispute is
not a national of a Contracting State, would be dealt with by the
Commission or Tribunal as a preliminary question, and that in any
proceedings in this connection a written affirmation of nationality
signed by or on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State
whose nationality is claimed by the party, would be conclusive evidence
of the facts stated therein." The reason for this change is that the
procedure for dealing with questions of nationality and their submission
to the ICJ seemed unduly cumbersome and there appeared to be no
compelling reason why the determination of nationality could not be left
primarily to the State whose nationality is claimed or, should that State
make no such determination, to the Conciliation Commission or Arbi-
tral Tribunal.4" A further objective test was adopted in this draft: "na-
tional of a Contracting State" was to mean a person (natural or juridi-
cal) possessing the nationality of any Contracting State on the date of
consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre, and included: (a) any company
which under the domestic law of that State was its national; and (b) any
company in which the nationals of that State had a controlling interest.
"Company" included any association of natural or juridical persons,
whether or not such association was recognied by the domestic law of
the Contracting State concerned as having juridical personality."
However, all provisions defining the term "nationality" were dropped
in subsequent drafts; the present Convention does not give definite cri-
teria for nationality. The only requirement for eligibility found in the
Convention is the possession of a nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute. The nationality of the investor
is not here of significance in the traditional sense of the link conferring
the right of protection of his State, a right withheld in any event, since
the right of diplomatic protection is to be given up by the national State
of the private party conducting proceedings under the Convention. Con-
sequently, the definitions in the Convention of "national of another
Contracting State," are not the essence of nationality itself.44 The na-
tionality is left to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal in light of
domestic and international law.45
The Convention does not require that nationality be specified in the
consent agreement. 6 If the private party to a dispute is a natural person,
"First Preliminary Draft, 2 HISTORY 148.
121d. at 152.
'Id. at 170.
"CONVENTION art. 25, para. 2.
112 HISTORY 579.
"This specification must be included in the request. SID CONVENTION art. 36, para. 2, and
1974]
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the general nationality requirement must be fulfilled on the date on
which the request for conciliation or arbitration is registered as well as
on the date of consent.47 The nationality of the private party may be
dubious and controversies may arise in this connection. These uncertain-
ties are most likely to occur in the case of corporate nationality.
Problems determining corporate nationality are made flexible in the
sense that the only date relevant for nationality is that on which the
parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Centre. Moreover, even if a
juridical person had the nationality of the State party to the dispute on
that date, the parties can agree that because of foreign control such a
person should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for
the purpose of the Convention.4" It must be stressed that the essence of
this procedure is the mutual consent of the parties. Under the Conven-
tion, control in itself is not an absolute nationality test or a general
criterion of nationality.49 This provision contains a general rule which
is not made more specific. This again broadens the scope of the Conven-
tion, since it is left to the parties to specify what is meant by "control"
for this purpose and the Convention does not require that this control
be exercised by the nationals of only one particular Contracting State
or that this State be named in the stipulation. This stipulation could
apply to all possible situations in which a company is incorporated in
the host State and is controlled or owned in great part by nations of
another State or in which a corporation, although organized under the
law of the host State, is a subsidiary of a foreign corporation. In all of
those cases, under the control test, that corporation could have foreign
nationality, instead of the formal citizenship of the place of incorpora-
tion.
As said, this nationality question is relevant only to determine
whether the facilities of the Centre could be used by the parties which
had agreed to do so.' Should the Secretary-General find on the basis
of the information contained in the request that the private party ob-
viously does not fall within the scope of Article 25(2) of the Convention,
he will refuse to register a request on the basis that the dispute is
manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre ratione personae.5 On
Institution Rule 2(l)(d).
"7CONVENTION art. 25, para. 2(a).
111d., para. 2(b).
"Neither does control in and of itself justify diplomatic protection of shareholders in customary
international law (beneficial ownership, as opposed to legal ownership).
"'The nationality of the parties must also be taken into account for the constitution of an
Aribitral Tribunal (CONVENTION arts. 38, 39, Arbitration Rule 1 (3)) or of an ad hoc Committee
considering the annulment of an award. CONVENTION art. 52, para. 3.
"
1CONVENTION art. 36, para. 3; Institution Rule 6(l)(b).
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the other hand, if the nationality of the private party is disputed, then
the Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal will be empow-
ered to determine the nationality."
In this connection, the question might arise as to which indicia the
Tribunal could take into account to determine positively the nationality
of a private juridical person. Under the scope of the Convention, the ties
of corporate nationality are in fact much looser than under customary
international law on the matter. On the other hand, since the Conven-
tion does not define the concept of nationality one will logically turn to
the general principles of the nationality as they apply in the field of State
responsibility. 3 Is it only the State of incorporation or the State where
the seat of management is located, which is conclusive? Are criteria of
ownership (i.e., "real" citizenship-where the owners of more than 50%
of the shares reside-if indeed that many reside in any one place),
control, etc. constitutive elements of nationality? It is probable that in
the spirit of the Convention a more functional approach may be ob-
served, taking into account the protection of the investment activity as
a whole. As Judge Riphagen said in his dissenting opinion on the judg-
ment of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, "a true bond of nation-
ality, such as exists between a State and its nationals who are natural
persons, is obviously inconceivable for juristic persons as such." ' 4 Also,
the ICJ stated in the Nottebohm case that the bond of nationality
between the State and the individual is not always a sufficient basis for
State protection. 5
In the general spirit of the Convention, more attention should be paid
to the nationality of the real rights which arise directly out of an invest-
ment, rather than to overly restrictive criteria, which very often rely on
a legal fiction. The very rigid position of the ICJ in the Barcelona
Traction case has been the origin of much controversy on the subject
of nationality. Even under the system of diplomatic protection, but
more than ever under the Convention, each case must be considered on
its individual merits. Or, in the words of Judge Gros in his separate
opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, to place the problem within the
controversial scheme of diplomatic protection once more:
"
2Art. 41, para. 2 of the Convention provides; "Any objection by a party to the dispute that that
dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the competence
of the Tribunal, shall be considered by the Tribunal which shall determine whether to deal with it
as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute."
,:'See supra note 38.
rl[1970] I.C.J. 3, 347. (Dissenting opinion of Judge Riphagen.)
'[1955] I.C.J. 3, 24.
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The company's link of bare nationality may not reflect any substantial
economic bond. As between the two criteria, the judge must choose the
one on the test of which the law and the facts coincide: it is the State
whose national economy is in fact adversely affected that possesses the
right to take legal action. ",
But by enunciating very strict principles for the establishment of corpo-
rate nationality, i.e., rejecting types of ties like those of ownership and
control, the Court limited the indicia that could be taken into account.
According to the ICJ, the traditional rule attributes the right of diplo-
matic protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of
which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered
office.57 One of the consequences of this state of the law is that an
investment in the form of shareholdings, that is, the content or economic
value of these shares, is not protected in public international law. "In
the present state of law," the court said in Barcelona Traction, "the
protection of shareholders requires that recourse be had to treaty stipu-
lations or special agreements directly concluded between the private
investor and the State in which the investment is placed. '58 It is true also
that the adoption of the theory of diplomatic protection of shareholders
could lead to competing diplomatic claims, which is obviously no longer
the case under the Convention.
Under the Convention the Contracting States have deviated from
thcse general principles. The private party is no longer a subject of the
diplomatic protection of his national State with all the ties which this
situation implies. Rather, he is granted direct and autonomous access
to an international forum. A private party will not be denied ius standi
on the basis of the classical pattern of interstate responsibility where
responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right.59
Under the Convention, it is not the existence or absence of this partic-
ular right which is decisive for the problem of the claimant's legal
capacity; the only requirement for a private party to have access to the
Centre after consent is that he be a national of a Contracting State other
than the contracting State party to the dispute. Since jurisdiction of the
-"[1970] I.C.J. 3, 280. (Separate opinon of Judge Gros.)
571ld. at 43.
11Id. at 48.
5 As the Permanent Court stated in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case:
This right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its own nationals because,
in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the State
and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection,
and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic protection that the right to take up a
claim and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged.
[1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 76, at 16.
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Centre rests essentially on consent between the parties, it is this instru-
ment of consent that should be referred to for the determination of the
nationality of that party, through consideration of factors such as the
capacity in which that party concluded the agreement and its identifica-
tion. Thus, there is no reason to extend the principles dictated in inter-
state decisions for the determination of the nationality of a company to
the private party under the Convention.
One could say that the Convention has remedied this unsatisfactory"'
state of law. The Convention is designed to replace the classical pattern
of diplomatic protection; principles of interstate responsibility do not
apply to claimants under it. Thus, while many controversies have arisen
in traditional international judicial practice with respect to an alleged
nationality for the purpose of diplomatic protection, this is not likely
to be the case in the scheme of the Convention. Indeed, since the Con-
vention offers individuals direct access to an international forum on a
consensual basis, it allows maximum freedom for the parties to act by
agreement.
In considering the principles governing the nationality of corporations
under the regime of diplomatic protection and, more particularly, the
principles governing the rights of shareholders for seeking redress on the
international legal plane as they apply in customary international law,
it is apparent to what extent the system of the Convention, having here
the character of lex specialis, deviates from them.
ENFORCEABILITY OF AWARDS
In the general context of this article, a final question must be raised:
How can the successful investor be sure that an award in his favor will
be executed by the adverse party? The way this question is generailly
phrased should not reflect an assumption that the Convention is to be a
tool in the hands of the investor against the host State. On the contrary,
the Convention is an extremely well balanced instrument. What is ex-
pressed here is the classical fear of the foreign investor, who is in many
cases much more vulnerable than the host State.
Third party arbitration awards are usually more freely enforced than
are foreign judgments. An award represents the carrying out of an
agreement between parties, whereas a judgment represents the act of
another sovereign. The general rule is that a valid award duly pron-
ounced by an international tribunal is binding upon the parties to the
"While in Barcelona Traction the I.C.J. recently took a very restrictive position for the establish-
ment of nationality on the international plane, judges in their separate opinions pleaded for more
flexibility in this respect. See supra notes 54 and 56.
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dispute which has been submitted to it and is considered to be final in
that particular dispute. The obligatory character of international deci-
sions, based on the principle of resjudicata, has gained general recogni-
tion and is a sanctioned principle of international law. The concept of
pacta sunt servanda, inherent in the contractual agreement or compro-
mise to arbitrate, is the second concept on which the obligatory
character of arbitral awards is based. Both principles6' are embodied in
Article 53(1) of the Convention, which provides: "The award shall be
binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party
shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the
extent enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant pro-
visions of this Convention."
As provided by the foregoing article, no appeals may be taken outside
of the procedures provided for by the Convention. The only post-award
remedies are those available under and regulated by the Convention
itself: (a) The original Tribunal may be requested to rectify any errors
and to supplement any incomplete decisions (i.e., when the Tribunal has
omitted to decide any questions submitted to it);62 (b) The original
Tribunal or, if necessary, a newly constituted one, may be requested to
interpret" or revise 4 an award; (c) The Chairman of the Council may
constitute an ad hoc Committee of Arbitration to consider the annul-
ment of an award on certain grounds specified in the Convention.15 If
the award is thus annulled in whole or in part, the dispute may be
submitted to a new Tribunal. Those different remedies in fact cover
most grounds on which execution could be refused in customary interna-
tional law. However, there is no recourse to an outside authority against
decisions of tribunals set up under the Convention, and even the classical
exception of public policy is no longer admitted. The applicability of
local law or the jurisdiction of local courts is excluded with regard to
the arbitral award. The Convention thereby goes beyond most of the
provisions of the existing conventions on recognition and enforcement
"'Both principles were established by the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes (1907), arts. 37, 81, 84. In the Soci~t6 Commerciale de Belgique case, the
Permanent Court declared, "Recognition of an award as res judicata means nothing else than
recognition of the fact that the terms of that award are definitive and obligatory." [1938] P.C.I.J.
Ser. A/B, No. 78, at 175 proceedings in which the principle was adopted are cited in E. NANTWI,
Tile ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAl LAW 74-75 (1966).
62CONVENTION art. 49, para. 2.
I1d., art. 50.
611d., art. 51.
'ld., art. 52.
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of foreign arbitral awards"6 which have been offered to internationalize
the award or to alleviate the problems in connection with the allocation
of juridical control over the recognition and enforcement of awards, as
between the rendering State and the enforcing State.
The case of default by a party is also dealt with by the Convention.
Failure of a party to appear or to present its case cannot prevent the
tribunal from rendering an award, though it is required to follow special
procedures in case of such a default. 7 The need for a default procedure
is a corollary of the binding character of the undertaking to have re-
course to arbitration.
Under customary law, the investor who has obtained an award
against a State that does not recognize the award will have to face
different requirements, according to the country in which he seeks en-
forcement. One of those requirements is the granting of an exequalur,
by which a foreign arbitral award must be reduced to a domestic judg-
ment. The external finality of ICSID awards vis-a-vis domestic jurisdic-
tions is stipulated in Article 54(1) of the Convention, which provides
that "Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pur-
suant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obliga-
tions s imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State." 9 Thus, the Contracting States have
agreed to consider an ICSID award as a final judgment of their own
courts without reexamination; this finality is subject only to the internal
remedies as provided by the Convention.
The consequence of the introduction of this principle into the different
legal systems is an absolute exception from the customary exequalur
procedure in the domestic jurisdiction of the Contracting States. For
this purpose, each Contracting State must designate to the Centre a
court or other authority competent to recognize and enforce awards
certified by the Secretary-General of the Centre.70 Though the execution
"See the United Nations 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959), arts. Iii-V, and the 1961 Geneva European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 484 U.N.T.S. 364 (1963) art. IX.
17CONVENTION art. 45, para. 2; see Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States: Applicable Law and Default Procedure
in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12, 17 (1967).
"Enforcement is limited to pecuniary obligations imposed by the award. This means practically,
that while an award would remain res judicata as to all its provisions between parties, enforcement
through the strongarm of the law would be limited to the obligation to pay a sum of money
contained in the award.
"The same article continues in its second sentence, "A Contracting State with a federal constitu-
tion may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts
shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state."
7"CONVENTION art. 54, para. 2.
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of awards under the Convention is governed by the laws concerning the
execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such
execution is sought,71 there are no longer any limitations or exceptions
on enforceability. The enforcement of the award is an international
obligation not only for both parties to the proceedings but also the
award is valid and enforceable in the jurisdiction of all Contracting
States as a final judgment of their own courts. Noncompliance would
be in violation of treaty obligations under the Convention, which implies
direct recourse to international law remedies.7" Although all Contract-
ing States have waived their requirements for the recognition of foreign
arbitral awards, the Convention does not provide a restriction on sover-
eign immunity from execution. As stated in Article 55 of the Conven-
tion: "Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the
law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State
or of any foreign State from execution." It must be stressed that the
situation under which a State would resist execution as being opposed
to its sovereign immunity is not in contradiction with its obligation to
execute the award under Article 54.
Article 54, as well as the exequatur procedure would do, grants auto-
matic executory force to an ICSID award. In case a State does not
enforce an award voluntarily, the obstacle of sovereign immunity from
execution intervenes only in the stage of the use of measures of
execution.7" While there is not to be any derogation from the laws
relating to the immunity of States from execution, the wide recognition
and enforceability of awards rendered pursuant to the Convention is one
of its principal features. The victor in arbitration will also be afforded
a wider choice of fora in which to enforce the award. The Contracting
States, by becoming parties to the SID Convention, have gone into an
express undertaking sanctioned under international law to execute the
awards rendered under the auspices of the Centre.74 One cannot go any
further than this maximum undertaking.
"ld., art. 54, para. 3; ED Report 43.
72The remedies are, as provided by the Convention itself: revival of the right of diplomatic
protection on the part of the investor's national State (art. 27, para. 1); proceedings before the
I.C.J. (art. 64).
7
:'The problem must be examined from a dual point of view: the immunity of a State from
execution of an award directed against it in its own court, and immunity of a foreign State from
such execution in the courts of the state in which execution is sought. The latter case is particularly
relevant here since under the Convention the victor in arbitration can seek enforcement in the
forum of his choice. Both cases have been placed on the same footing in the Convention. While
arbitration awards will normally be complied with voluntarily, the parties to the dispute and all
Contracting States having legally bound themselves to do so, many states still adhere to the theory
that any sovereign is immune from forced execution.
7 For further comments on the award enforcement provisions of the Convention, see Broches,
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CONCLUSION
How can ICSI D encourage the flow of foreign capital? When foreign
investors contemplate investing in another country, they are influenced
in making their decision by that country's stability of structure, but
mainly by the safeguards offered. The final test of the effectiveness of
the Centre is the binding character of the undertaking to arbitrate before
an impartial international forum and the enforceability of awards result-
ing from such arbitration. As to this, it may be said that the Convention
offers maximum security in the present stage of development of both
conventional and customary international law. In addition, the many
options that are open to parties to ICSID arbitration before and after
the institution of proceedings, were designed to meet the requirements
of today's investments.
This article gives only a very incomplete account of the provisions of
the Convention. The extent to which the Convention has succeeded in
filling some lacunae appearing in the traditional pattern of the settle-
ment of international investment disputes has been illustrated by a few
of its most important features. In submitting their disputes to arbitra-
tion under the auspices of the Centre, the parties involved avoid litiga-
tion over the procedural aspects of the arbitration they are conducting.
They are also offered maximum security as to the cooperation of the
other party and as to the enforceability of resulting awards. The effi-
ciency and the flexibility of the procedures set out in the Convention
therefore, responds to the needs of today's international investment
community.
The Convention the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of Int'l Law) 331, 396-405 (1972); West, Award
Enforcement Provisions of the World Bank Convention, 23 ARB. J. 1, 38 (1968).
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